Russo-Turkish War of Liberation
1877-1878
Chapter Two - Russo-Turkish War of Liberation 1877-1878
Plans of the Russian command
The Russian command had considered fighting with the Ottoman Empire since 1856, but it was only 20 years later when General Obruchev, officer from the Russian Headquarters, worked out a concrete plan for the war. He authored two projects on which later the headquarters of the Danube army drew when elaborating the plan used in conducting the war.
The first draft plan for immediate start of the war was submitted to Emperor Alexander II, the crown prince Alexander Alexandrovich and the Military Minister D. Milyutin in Livadia on October 3, 1876. The project was also brought to the knowledge of King Nikolai Nikolaevich, when he was appointed chief commander of the Danube army, and he agreed to its main aspects.
The war, however, did not start in autumn. Conditions changed in winter. Turks increased their forces on the Balkan Peninsula and the international situation had deteriorated. Thus in the spring of 1877 the second plan came to the fore. Under this plan, the Russian command had chosen the Balkan Peninsula as the main theater of military activities. A secondary role was attributed to the Caucasian front.
During the war, the Russian command had as an objective the abolition of the Ottoman rule on the Balkan Peninsula. Under the Russian plan, there were two ways to accomplish the task – either defeat the Turkish army or conquer the capital town of the Empire. “…Only on the shores of the Bosphorus”, wrote Obruchev, “can the Turkish rule be annihilated and a lasting peace can be achieved, thus deciding once and for all our dispute …..concerning the Balkan Christians”.
It was necessary to choose the shortest and most convenient way of the offensive towards Tzarigrad. Under the Russian plan, the advance along the seaside was rejected as inappropriate since the Russian army would pass by the strongest Turkish fortresses such as Silistra, Shoumen, and Varna, where most of the population was capable of mounting an unyielding defense, while Russia had still lacked a strong navy in the Black Sea capable of countering the Turkish naval units.
The direction Svishtov-Nikopol-Stara Planina passages-Kazanluk, Odrin-Tzarigrad was considered most favorable for the advance of the main units. In the region of Svishtov, the territory of the Ottoman Empire jutted out deep into the river Danube and the distance to Tzarigrad was only 542 km. The way went around the Turkish fortified rectangular and the population in these regions was predominantly Bulgarian. Considering these factors, the Russian command decided to make an offensive towards the river in the region of Svishtov and to make its way through the Balkan Mountains towards southern Bulgaria and Tzarigrad. It was decided, that in the region of Galac a secondary-ranked unit in terms of force would stage an ostentatious crossing of the river Danube.
“Sticking on to the central direction”, wrote Obruchev, “our army would have the opportunity to extend assistance to the population in all countries and if necessary, could easily coordinate its activities with the Serbian and Montenegrin armies”.
The Russian command was aware of the difficulties that had to be overcome. The Russian army had to cross the river Danube and the Stara Planina Mountains. On the other hand, the Ottoman Empire had a strong army, numerous fortresses and the “fanaticized Muslim mass, determined to resist without any mercy”.
Those difficulties could be overcome only with resolute and quick actions. The Russian command had assessed the need to save some time in order to be able to deploy its armies across the Balkans. One of the armies took responsibility for the military actions in northern Bulgaria, while the other headed towards the southern Bulgaria and then Tzarigrad via the Stara Planina Mountains. The command plan had envisaged 4-5 weeks to surmount the Turkish resistance without getting involved into any operations of secondary importance. Those two armies were expected to total 330,000 men.
In fact, only part of the plan was implemented during the war. The offensive towards Tzarigrad was thwarted due to fact that the Danube Army was not sufficiently manned and supporting units were sent over from Russian several times in the course of the military actions.
Notes
- Marinov M., The Russian-Turkish Liberation War , pp. 45, Sofia : 1977
- Ibid.
- Ibid.
- Ibid.