Russo-Turkish War of Liberation 1877-1878

Chapter One - State of the countries, participating in the war, their armies and weapons at the start of the war

Bulgarian volunteers' corps as armed force

At first sight, it seems that there is nothing new to be added to the prolific writing on the Bulgarian volunteers' corps, which took part in the Russian-Turkish War 1877-1878. In order to obtain a clear idea of the Bulgarian volunteers' corps as an armed organized entity, it is necessary to have a short overview of its formation, preparation for participation in the war, sources and ways of arms and accoutrements procurement. Besides, the characteristics of the personal small arms warrants an objective assessment as they had created the conditions for the high morale demonstrated by farmers, students, craftsmen and teachers who were ready to sacrifice their life for FREEDOM.

The decision to set up a Bulgarian military unit within the Russian army was taken on November 13, 1876 at a meeting of Military Minister Dmitrii Milyutin, King Nikolai Nikolaevich and Emperor Alexander. Initially, it was foreseen to set up a guards' unit of volunteers attached to the main headquarters under the name “Headquarters convoy” having mainly protective functions. However, on 17 April 1877, taking into account the volunteers' wish, the main commander of the Danube Army included the volunteers' corps in the composition of the military units. On one hand, the armament of the Bulgarian volunteers' corps was a matter of prestige for those who had launched the idea. On the other, it was a precondition for the creation of an efficient military unit. Foreseeing the escalation of the conflict between Russia and Turkey, Moscow Slavic charity committees had started to collect funds as early as July 15, 1876. Thanks to the active participation of Ivan Sergeevich Aksakov, a renowned Slavophil, some individuals from Russia and abroad had donated considerable contributions. On this occasion, Emanuel Bogoridi wrote to the Bucharest bishop: “Your Highness, I have written to Stefan Beron to transfer to Your Holiness the amount of 4,000 francs for the needs of our national cause…”

As early as the autumn of 1876, a decision was taken to order weapons from Germany for the armament of the Bulgarian volunteers in the Russian-Bulgarian brigade in Serbia.1 In September 1876, I.S. Aksakov told General R. Fedeev that the collected contributions to the benefit of Bulgarians “were in his disposition”. Aksakov asked to receive information on the purchase of weapons.

Colonel Sitenko, a friend of the Slavic committees, was entrusted with the task to negotiate the supply. He managed to conclude a contract with the company of Adolf List in Germany, providing for the delivery of 20,000 rifles Chassepot mod 1866 and 6,000,000 bullets for them.

Why had exactly these rifles attracted the attention of the Slavic committees? One of the possible reasons is the fact that the rifles were offered by Germany at a good price. At that time, they were not needed for the German army any more since they had remained as a trophy from the French-Prussian War. The other reason was the good reputation of the needle guns, which they had attained in the course of several European conflicts by proving the advantage of weapons with rear loading. In his proclamation to the volunteers, the renowned Captain Raicho Nikolov, a good military specialist, wrote: “Can you come again to Ploesht to get armed with good needle guns and bravely march forward with our elder brethren…” On May 31, 1877, in a letter to his wife, Dragan Tzankov wrote: “The Bulgarian army amounts to 4,000 persons, who are well dressed, well armed, and well fed”. Therefore, no one had doubts as to the quality of Chassepot rifles. On the other side, however, 1876-1877 saw the invention of new systems of weapons with unitary metal bullet, which had better technical qualities in comparison with the needle guns.

In the first half of August, upon the arrival Colonel Sitnenko to Petersburg, the number of guns to be purchased was finally decided. In two telegrams addressed to A. List, he specified that 10,000 Chassepot guns were to be bought initially, though the deposit for 20,000 guns would be paid.2 Sitnenko had further asked for more information on the batteries, which List had offered at the price of 26,000 marks each. In his answer, the tradesman from Leipzig had declared that the 20,000 guns were to be examined beforehand by the best consultant on weapons in Berlin. He found 15,000 “better”, i.e. of better quality guns, but had pledged to take Chassepot as was agreed.3

The purchase and export of arms and munitions from Germany could not be done without the agreement of the government. For this reason, the conditions of the agreement that was later concluded with the German government were drawn up during the negotiations between A. List and the envoys of General Fadeev. The document entitled “Conditions for the transfer of 10,000 rifles Chassepot mod 1866 with bayonets and bullets” was simultaneously produced in Russian and German languages.4 The document was dated September 4, 1876. The conditions of the contract were as follows:

•  The rifles are sold together with bayonets but without any other accessories in the condition, in which they were, and only separate rifles are to be tested;

•  120 bullets are allocated to each rifle;

•  Prices are as follows: 20 marks for a rifle with a bayonet; 12 marks for 1,000 bullets;

•  If demanded, boxes can be given in quantities at disposal of the Military Ministry;

•  Rifles and bayonets come from the Maintz and Cassel arsenal, bullets – form the Kolenetz, Maintz and Magdeburg arsenal;

•  The weapons are sold on condition that they will exported from Germany within three months;

•  The payment for the rifles and bullets is to be effected at the Central Imperial Military Fund before the weapons are transferred;

•  The weapons and bullets are to be taken within three months after the deal is negotiated;

•  By the end of the deal negotiations, 150,000 marks for 100,000 rifles are to be transferred to the Central Military Fund as a guarantee. This deposit is to be used by the bank as a penalty fee in case of failure to pay for the whole deal within the determined deadline;

•  In case of governmental ban on the export of arms and munitions issued before the deal is implemented, the Military Ministry can not be held accountable and losses are at the expense of the buyer.

The agreement was signed by the Military Ministry and the Military Department of the German Empire.5

In October 1876, the first delivery of rifles arrived at Ungeni sent via Maintz, Warsaw, and Odessa. From there, the arms were delivered to Chisinau and Ploesht, where they were assembled.

The cartridge pouches were delivered by the Russian Commissariat in December 1876.

In his journal, the commander of the third volunteers' unit lieutenant-colonel Stefan Ivanov Kissov gives a detailed description of the armament and accoutrements of Bulgarian volunteers in the following way:

•  A double-breasted military coat of dark green cloth, later named “Bulgarian girl”, with a folded collar, with no waist, with pockets and copper buttons. Apart from its beauty, the “Bulgarian girl” had the advantage of staying loose without pressing the volunteer who had not been used to the tight military uniform;

•  Trousers of dark green cloth with no edges;

•  Hat of black lamb leather with a lining of green cloth and a cockade of bronze cross;

•  boots with long legs;

•  Overcoat of grey cloth.

Each volunteer had received:

A/ Accoutrements

•  Two leather cartridge pouches

•  Two bags for personal things, bread, and bullets;

•  Water bottle and a dish.

B/ Armament

•  Rifle Chassepot with tussock in place of bayonet

•  Bullets with paper cartridge case.

Military education was introduced in parallel to the formation of the Bulgarian Volunteers' Corps. S. Kisov writes: “After the volunteers were armed and provided with munitions, their intensive exercising started. All in all, most of the volunteers were familiar with the rifle, namely knew how to shoot, knew to some extent how to keep it, knew how to march, as most of them were in Serbia, where they were fighting, though much had to be desired in this respect”.

Despite the short duration of the training, Bulgarian volunteers successfully mastered the weapon and the military discipline. The shooting tests demonstrated that they could strike 80-92 percent of their targets at distance of 200 feet. These results evoked the admiration of commanding officers. The exercises allotted time for strikes with bayonets as well. Russian commanding officers were still slaves to the slogan “bullet-fool, bayonet-brave”.

Bulgarian volunteers attended carefully to their arms. They cleaned their rifles after each exercise. “It should be noted”, S. Kissov wrote, “that volunteers loved and caressed their guns, though when shooting they could show off their temper”.

Defects would often appear after an intensive shooting. The needles could break; sometimes the bolts could not fit entirely. Accidents happened when recharging the gun. On one hand, some failings of the construction were to be blamed for this. On the other, it was the lack of enough experience and technical literacy when handling guns.

Nevertheless, Bulgarian volunteers made a very good impression on Alecxander II, when he visited the Bulgarian Volunteers' Corps on April 12, 1877 in Chisinau.

The long guns Chassepot were suitable for the infantry units, but could not be used by the cavalry. For the cavalry unit, which was planned to be set up within the Bulgarian Volunteers' Corps, more suitable weapons were needed. At the beginning of June 1877, the field artillery commandment of the acting army informed General Nikolai Grigorievich Stoletov, the commanding officer of the Volunteers' Corps that 600 carbines and 600 swords were sent for the Bulgarian cavalry units. The carbines were Berdana N-2. Cavalry units, however, had not been established. Only a small horseman contingent was created for reconnaissance and liaison.

Officers and first sergeants from the Volunteers' Corps were armed with Smith&Wesson revolvers, which were widely used in the Russian army. They were provided from the depots of the acting army.

In the course of the preparation of the Volunteers' Corps, some differences of opinion emerged between its commanding officer and the head of the artillery of the acting army with relation to the reserves of munitions. The commanding officer was of the opinion that that 160 bullets should be allocated for each gun, while the head of the artillery considered as sufficient 120 bullets, which were available as of May 27, 1877.

General Stoletov turned to be right. It is known that there was a shortage of bullets in the course of the defensive military activities on mount Saint Nicolas. For the sake of comparison, it is worth noting that the Turkish commandment provided 200 bullets for each gun in the fights around the town of Pleven.

Upon the successful completion of its preparation, the Bulgarian Volunteers' Corps was incorporated into the Frontline military detachment, which took part in the defense of the Shipka passage and in the defeat of the Turkish army at Shipka-Sheinovo. Well-armed and with extremely high morale, the Bulgarian Volunteers' Corps constituted a serious fighting unit.

Undoubtedly, the most dramatic moments experienced by the Bulgarian Volunteers' Corps were during the Shipka fights in August 1877. The mountain climate had its surprises for the dedicated defenders of the Shipka passage. The night dampness and the frequent mountain showers moistened the paper bullets of the Chassepot guns. For this reason, a number of commanding officers were sending alarming signals. For example, on August 1, 1877 the commanding officer of volunteers' detachment III, Captain Stessel, reported that “due to rains, the bullets can not be used”. A similar report was sent by lieutenant-colonel Redkin, commander of detachment IV, who announced that “more that two thirds of the bullets can not be used”.

A while later, new complications came to the surface during the hot August days. The high temperature and the frequent shooting damaged the gasket of the breech-bolt of the Chassepot guns and to the break of their needles. One of the wounded volunteers wrote: “What am I supposed to do with this Chassepot gun? I see the enemy is positioned well in front of me and just when I am about to strike him, the gun misses fire. I want to change the bullet, but it can not fit in and have to try to pull it by force. What can I do now?” The volunteer managed to get another gun and made his way forward saying: “Let's see whether you will continue to aim your gun at me?”

At the same time, the commanding officer of Brigade I of the Volunteers' Corps, Colonel Fiodor Mihailovich Depreradovich, had noted with great pity in his journal: “As soon as someone tried to get up a little, the skilful Turkish shooters turned to him with fire”.

It became clear during the Shipka fights that the Chassepot rifles were not suitable weapons for our volunteers. In reply to the demands for rearmament of the volunteers' units, the head of the artillery depots of the acting army reports to General Masalski that “3,000 guns6 were ready for delivery to the volunteers, and the remaining around 2,000 guns were to arrive within three days”. The rearming, however, proceeded at slow pace. As a result, the second echelon of the Volunteers' Corps remained armed with Chassepot guns.

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